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NOTE
Torts: Kraszewski v. Baptist Medical Center
of Oklahoma, Inc. - The Oklahoma Supreme Court
Recognizes the Tort of Intentional Infliction
of Severe Emotional Distress in a New Context
L Introduction
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, prior to Kraszewski v. Baptist Medical Center
of Oklahoma, Inc.,' had explicitly adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section
46.2 This section of the Restatement3 recognizes the need to protect an individual's
mental and emotional well being from intentional invasions.4 The section is divided
into two subsections: section 46(1) concerns conduct directed at a primary victim,
while section 46(2) concerns conduct directed at a third person.5 Section 46 clearly
contemplates a distinction between direct infliction of severe emotional distress and
infliction of emotional distress on a third party.
1. 916 P.2d 241 (Okla. 1996).
2. See Breeden v. League Servs. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Okla. 1978); see also Williams v. Lee
Way Motor Freight, Inc., 688 P.2d 1294, 1297 nA (Okla. 1984) (noting the court has "virtually adopted"
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). The section is as follows:
Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and
if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to a member of such
person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results
in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress
results in bodily harm.
Id.
4. See W. PAGE KEErON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (5th
ed. 1984).
5. For analytical clarity throughout this note, the distinction between the "primary victim" and the
"third party" will be illustrated in the following example: A is sitting on her front porch watching her
husband B, who is standing on the sidewalk. C, who hates B and is friendly to A, whose presence is
known to him, stabs B, killing him. The "primary victim" in this scenario is B, whereas the "third party"
is A. In "bystander"-type cases, the plaintiff is always a "third party." This illustration was utilized in
Taylor v. Vallelunga, 339 P.2d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), which is more fully discussed infra notes 125-
29 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. 1, illus. 21 (1965)
(suggesting, in a similar fact scenario, that C would be subject to liability to A for intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, fails to recognize this distinction. In
Breeden v. League STervices Corp.,6 the court recognized the first subsection and
applied it in a case in which the primary victim sued a defendant for intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress.7 On its face, the Kraszewski case appears to
implicate the second subsection. Kraszewski, a third party, sued Defendant for
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress arising when Kraszewski viewed
Defendant injuring his wife. Otherwise there is no reference to what Defendant has
to do with the wife being injured. However, the court declined to follow section
46(2) and instead created a new and confusing mutation of the subsection.
In place of the Restatements version of intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress on third parties, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Kraszewski, adopted a
cause of action that both mirrors other jurisdiction's tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress and burdens plaintiffs with excessive pleading requirements.
Indeed, the court provided a means by which a plaintiff can recover more easily
under a negligence cause of action than a plaintiff asserting intentional infliction of
severe emotional distr-ess. This anomalous result occurs because the court ignored the
most important aspect of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress - the
intentional or reckless nature of the defendant's conduct. In a somewhat knee-jerk
reaction, the court integrated the elements of the negligence action into the
requirements for the intentional action, requiring the plaintiff to prove actual physical
involvement in the incident giving rise to the alleged injury. Absent a change in
position by the court, the Kraszewski decision will guide future litigation in which
a plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of severe emotional distress in a bystander-
type situation.
According to the Kraszewski court, in order for a plaintiff to establish a cause of
action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, he must allege three
criteria: (1) the plaintiff must be directly physically involved in the accident; (2) the
plaintiff must be damnaged from actually viewing the injury to another rather than
from learning of the accident later; and (3) a familial or other close relationship must
exist between the plaintiff and the primary victim.8
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court explicitly rejected the "bystander" theory,
which allows a third party to claim damages from viewing the harm inflicted on
another,9 the court nevertheless adopted criteria for the tort that closely resemble
bystander cases and section 46(2) of the Restatement.0 However, by emphasizing
the necessity of physical harm directed to the plaintiff-third party, the court appears
to have ignored Restatement section 46(2). Rather, the court's rationale seems to
focus on the harm directed specifically at the plaintiff separate and apart from the
harm inflicted on the primary victim." When viewed in this light, the case seems
6. 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla. 1978).
7. See id. at 1377.
8. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 243.
9. See KEETON, supra note 4, § 54, at 365-67.
10. See discussion infra part VI.C.





to be controlled either by Restatement section 46(1) or by concepts pulled from the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. By failing to discuss the distinction
between negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the court falls prey to the elusive concepts involved in recovery
for emotional distress.
This note first outlines the history of mental or emotional damages in Oklahoma
and the court's reluctance to compensate emotional harm without some physical
manifestation. Second, the Kraszewski case itself is discussed. Third, this note
analyzes the holding of the Kraszewski case, how this decision was reached, and
problems with its interpretation of this area of tort law. Fourth, in light of the court's
explicit adoption of section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, this note urges
the adoption of section 46(2) as the more flexible and meaningful rule. Finally, the
basis of liability issue is discussed, noting the Oklahoma Supreme Court's failure to
discuss the issue in Kraszewski and emphasizing the importance of the issue when
analyzing the tort.
II. Historical Development of Emotional Damages in Oklahoma
A. The Physical Manifestation Requirement
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to compensate mental
anxiety or emotional disturbance in the absence of some physical injury or physical
suffering unless the emotional disturbance was attached to some other liability theory.
Many of the early cases in which damages for emotional or mental injury were
claimed involved the alleged negligent actions of common carriers,"2 telegraph
companies, 3 or beverage-bottling companies. 4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court based its denial of damages for mental suffering
on at least three concerns: (1) the court's proper role in the governmental structure,"
(2) the validity of mental injury in the absence of physical manifestation, 6 and (3)
stare decisis. 7 The court, adhering to a formalist interpretation, held that if the right
to mental damages cannot be found in the common law, then the court is powerless
to place it there in the absence of legislative authorization." Further, the court was
concerned that mental distress claims for such things as anguish and anxiety were too
remote and too intangible to form a basis for recovery of damages. 9 Finally, the
12. See, e.g., St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Keiffer, 150 P. 1026 (Okla. 1915).
13. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Choteau, 115 P. 879 (Okla. 1911).
14. See, e.g., Van Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1951); see also
Nail v. McCullough & Lee, 212 P. 981 (Okla. 1923) (mutilation of corpse).
15. See Choteau, 115 P. at 881.
16. See Keiffer, 150 P. at 1028.
17. See Choteau, 115 P. at 880; see also Miller v. Miller, No. 87615, 1998 WL 128795, at *8 (Okla.
1998) (noting primary objections to recognition of tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
include difficulty proving causation, danger of fraudulent claims, and the fear of a flood of litigation).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 881 (quoting Rowan v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 F. 550, 552 (C.C.N.D.
Iowa 1907)). See also generally KEEiMON, supra note 4, § 12, at 55.
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court was committed to the doctrine of stare decisis; while disclaiming agreement
with the rule denying recovery for mental damages, the court nevertheless strictly
applied it in cases where no physical injury was shown.'
However, the outcomes of mental suffering cases were magically transformed
when the plaintiff showed some physical injury or suffering relating to the mental
distress. In the formative years of mental distress damages, recovery was allowed
when physical injury produced mental distress2' but denied when the mental distress
produced physical injury." In modem cases, physical injury or physical manifes-
tation of injury was required irrespective of when the mental distress occurred.'
These decisions were all made interpreting the following oft-quoted passage: "No
recovery can be had for mental pain and anguish, which is not produced by,
connected with, or the result of, some physical suffering or injury, to the person
enduring the mental anguish."'
Cases that required physical injury to precede mental suffering seized on the
language "produced by" and "result of," holding that physical suffering must be a
cause of the mental suffering.' The court wished to be certain that the defendant's
"wrong" was the cause of the plaintiffs damages. That is, the court viewed the
mental damages as inseparable from the physical suffering and, therefore, part of the
plaintiffs compensable injury. In that same vein, the court did not wish to
compensate mere mental injury which caused physical suffering.' The mental injury
was evidently not part of the original wrong committed against the plaintiff, and the
subsequent physical suffering could not properly be attributed to the defendant's
conduct.'
20. See Keiffer, 150 P. at 1028 ("Whether we personally agree with the rule or not, nevertheless it
is the law of Oklahoma....").
21. See, e.g., Thompson v. Minnis, 202 P.2d 981 (Okla. 1949). To illustrate the transparent nature
of the physical suffering requirement, Thompson involved a situation where the mental suffering arose
out of the claimed physical injury of "hunger." Id. at 986. Of course, absence of physical injury was
itself sufficient to deny n cause of action. See, e.g., Seidenbach's, Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 185, 187
(Okla. 1961) (disallowing a cause of action for mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment which
allegedly resulted from breach of contract but did not result in physical injury).
22. See, e.g., Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Francis, 245 P.2d 84, 86 (Okla. 1952) (denying
plaintiff relief because his nausea at seeing dead mouse "stemmed exclusively from his mental reaction"
and noting a different result if plaintiff had become nauseated and vomited as result of the taste and had
a subsequent mental con Jition).
23. See, e.g., Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1980) (Oklahoma law);
Ellington v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Tulsa, 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986).
24. See, e.g., Ellington, 717 P.2d at 111; Jines v. City of Norman, 351 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Okla.
1960); Thompson, 202 P.2d at 985; Keiffer, 150 P. at 1028; see also KEEMON, supra note 4, § 54, at 362
("[Clases will obviously be infrequent in which 'mental disturbance,' not so severe as to cause physical
harm, will clearly be a serious wrong worthy of redress and sufficiently attested by the circumstances
of the case.").
25. See, e.g., Franc~s, 245 P.2d at 86.
26. See id
27. See KE-TON, supra note 4, § 54, at 362-63 ("With a cause of action established by the physical
harm, 'parasitic' damage; are awarded, and it is considered that there is sufficient assurance that the




Later, the court decided that recovery for mental damages should not depend on
whether mental suffering preceded or succeeded the physical suffering.' The court
cited the above-quoted passage, but this time invoked the word "connected" to
conclude that temporal placement of the physical injury is immaterial; the only
important issue is whether there was in fact a physical injury.
B. Willful or Wanton Conduct: Physical Impact Not Required
The Oklahoma Supreme Court discarded the physical injury requirement in other
cases. In circumstances where the defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable,
the court held that an independent action for mental pain and suffering could be
brought." More specifically, the defendant's conduct had to be characterized as
"willful" in order for the independent cause of action to lie?' According to the
court, the plaintiff had to show a "willful wrong of such a character that the mental
suffering is recognized as an ordinary, natural and proximate result of such a
wrong.
32
The allowance of an independent claim of damages for mental suffering was a
precursor to formal recognition of the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress.33 According to the court, the interests in emotional and mental security
were sufficiently important to warrant protection even in the absence of physical
suffering. In recognizing this change in nomenclature, the court expressly cited
section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stated that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court follows the Restatements guidelines'
28. See, e.g., Ellington, 717 P.2d at 111; Obieli, 623 F.2d at 670; Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 195 F.2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1952) (Oklahoma law) (recognizing the majority rule that the right to
recover is not dependent on the nature of results but rather on the nature of tortious conduct, but
nevertheless recognizing that "shock" was a compensable physical injury).
29. See, e.g., Ellington, 717 P.2d at 111.
30. E.g., Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1976) (holding that an autopsy performed at an
open and public site was not of sufficient character to be considered willful wrong); Mashunkashey v.
Mashunkashey, 113 P.2d 190 (Okla. 1941).
31. See, e.g., Dean, 556 P.2d at 261; Mashunkashey, 113 P.2d at 191.
32. Dean, 556 P.2d at 261. In Mashunkashey, 113 P.2d at 191, the court held that to "fraudulently
induce one to enter into a bigamous marriage contract would constitute such a wrong." See also KEETON,
supra note 4, § 34, at 212-14 (describing degrees of care and noting that willful, wanton, and reckless
conduct mean the same thing or come out the "same legal exit"). The Oklahoma Supreme Court's
recognition of the independent action based on "willful" conduct can be seen as a precursor to either the
intentional cause of action for severe emotional distress, or (more likely) the reckless cause of action for
severe emotional distress, both of which are subsumed under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965). For a discussion of the recognition of an action for reckless infliction of severe emotional
distress, see KEETON, supra note 4, § 12, at 64, and infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
33. See Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 688 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Okla. 1984) (stating that
Oklahoma follows section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts) ("The right to recover damages for
emotional distress is not dependent on physical injury."); see also Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855, 866
(Okla. 1987) (recognizing that physical injury is not required).
34. See Williams, 688 P.2d at 1296.
35. See id. But once again, the question of whether the court adopted section 46(2) is still debatable
and the Kraszewski case does not provide much use in resolving the debate. If anything, the Kraszewski
case can be seen as an implicit rejection of section 46(2). See discussion infra part VI.C.
1998]
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C. Third Parties Claiming Mental or Emotional Damages
It is thus clear that the Oklahoma Supreme Court does not require physical injury
in cases where the defendant's conduct is willfully or intentionally directed at the
plaintiff.' What remains unclear, even in the light of the Kraszewski case, are the
requirements for a cause of action predicated on the conduct of the defendant and his
actions relative to a third party.
The earliest cases in which a third party claimed mental suffering damages from
the alleged negligence of the defendant toward the primary victim were the common
carrier, telegraph, and bottling cases mentioned above." For example, in St. Louis
& San Francisco Railway v. Keiffer,38 the plaintiff claimed mental damages because
he had to watch th,-s suffering and worry of his brother immediately prior to death.
According to the plaintiff, this suffering was a result of the defendant's failure to get
a train to its destination on time and, as a result, the plaintiffs decedent "abandoned
all hope for life."39
In deciding such third party cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not focus on
the nature of the defendant's conduct or on the effect of liability in the context of
such third party damages. Rather, the focus was on the noncompensable nature of
mental distress damages when unaccompanied by some physical manifestation.'
Further, these early cases all involved the alleged negligence of the defendant. The
plaintiff claimed damages from the alleged negligence of the defendant in the
defendant's dealings with the plaintiffs decedent. In all of these cases, recovery was
denied when the mental suffering was unaccompanied by physical symptoms.41
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has never decided a case where the defendant was
regarded as intentionally causing emotional distress to a third party. Therefore, the
case law was ripe for a clear and concise decision outlining the cause of action for
emotional distress, whether negligent or intentional. The need for such a decision
was reinforced by the court's explicit adoption of section 46 of the Restatement but
silence regarding section 46(2).
36. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
38. 150 P. 1026 (Okla. 1915).
39. Id. at 1028. The facts of Keiffer are similar to other cases decided by the court. See, e.g.,
Choteau, 115 P. at 879; Thompson, 202 P.2d at 983.
40. See, e.g., Keiffer, 150 P. at 1028.
41. The Restatement recognizes this "physical impact" theory in its discussion of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. A defendant is liable for emotional distress if he should have realized that his
conduct involved a reasanable risk of causing emotional distress and, from the facts, should have realized
that the distress might result in "illness or bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313
(1965); see also id. § 313 cmt. a ("The rule stated in this section does not give protection to mental and
emotional tranquillity in itself. In general ... there is no liability where the actor's negligent conduct





I. Statement of the Case
A. Facts and Questions Presented
The facts of the Kraszewski case are startling. Kraszewski and his wife were
walking across the parking lot of a grocery store. Defendant had spent the entire
afternoon in a local bar and was legally intoxicated.42 Defendant sat in his pickup
truck in the parking lot near the grocery store entrance immediately prior to the
incident. As the Kraszewski couple made their way' across the lot, Defendant
accelerated rapidly toward the couple, as evidenced by twenty feet of skid marks on
the parking lot surface. The vehicle struck Kraszewski in the knee, chest and
shoulder and knocked Kraszewski back from the truck. Kraszewski's wife was pinned
underneath the vehicle and dragged sixty feet through the parking lot.43 The driver
only stopped the vehicle because he was forced to by backed-up traffic. After the
driver backed off Mrs. Kraszewski's body, Mr. Kraszewski held her and comforted
her until the paramedics arrived. She died later that evening."
Kraszewski filed a wrongful death action and a claim for intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress.45 The parties privately settled the wrongful death action.'
Therefore, the sole issue on appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Kraszewski on the claim for
42. Defendant's blood alcohol content was .14, which is .04 above the legal limit. See 47 OKLA.
STAT. § 11-902 (1991) ("Persons under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substance or
combination thereof. A. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person to drive,
operate, or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state who: 1. Has a blood or
breath alcohol concentration... of ten-hundredths (0.10) or more at the time of a test of such person's
blood or breath administered within two (2) hours after the arrest of such person .....
43. Mr. Kraszewski testified as follows:
[I] parked in this area here and Mary and I got out of the car. We walked this way,
which is west. And we got to this point when we angled northwest. We were about eight
to ten feet away from the truck. I took another step. Mary was to my left. I was holding
her hand. And the truck lurched from a standing stop, brushed me back, knocked me
back. I pounded the truck as it went by knocking down Mary and dragged her more than
50 feet.... [V]e were about eight to ten feet away. I took another step, Mary and I took
another step and the truck lurched at us. In that step, my knee was struck, my right knee
was struck, and I felt the impact of my chest and shoulder. And it continued faster and
faster and I hit with my hands on the side of the truck. I yelled, stop, stop ....
Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 244 n.5.
44. See id. The driver of the truck pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and manslaughter
in the first degree. He was sentenced to 38 years in prison, 24 of which were suspended.
45. Kraszewski's original action was for reckless infliction of emotional distress. This claim was
dismissed without prejudice when faced with a summary judgment motion. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d
at 244. Kraszewski refiled the action claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress. When again
faced with a summary judgment motion, the court allowed the plaintiff to amend to include the claim
for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. The court, however, sustained a summary judgment
motion for both claims. See id. at 245.
46. See id. The husband's complaint named the driver, the hospital where his wife was treated, and
the doctors charged with her care. The driver's insurance company intervened. See id. at 244.
1998]
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intentional infliction of severe emotional distress caused from viewing the injuries
and suffering of his wife.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court. According
to the court, Kraszewski could state a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress lecause: (1) he was directly physically involved in the incident,
(2) his damages arose from actually viewing the injury to the primary victim rather
than from learning of the accident later, and (3) there existed a familial or other close
personal relationship between him and the primary victim.47
The court limited the damages under this theory to those Kraszewski suffered as
a result of watching his wife's injuries and her suffering up to the time of death as
opposed to emotional damages from the death itself.48 Defendant claimed that
allowing recovery for Kraszewski's emotional suffering would allow for double
recovery - recoveiy in both the wrongful death action and the emotional distress
action49 However, the court, in a chronological parsing out of mental damages,
distinguished Krasz-wski's emotional damages arising from the death of the wife,
which are properly within the wrongful death action, and Kraszewski's emotional
damages from viewing the injuries and suffering of his wife, which are recoverable
under the emotional distress actionm°
B. Rationale of the Kraszewski Opinion
1. Bystander Ver.-us Direct Victim
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's discussion of the legal issues is a jumble of tort
liability theory. First, the court distanced itself from "bystander" cases in which the
emotional distress is inflicted on a party not directly involved in the accident."
According to the court, bystander cases arise "where the mental pain or suffering is
caused from viewing acts which result in another's suffering rather than from the
plaintiffs own personal physical involvement.""2 Rather, the correct focus for a
cause of action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress should be on
"direct victims."3 While the emotional damages of direct victims are also caused
by viewing the suffering of another, the difference is that these plaintiffs were
47. See id. at 245.
48. See id at 244 n,2.
49. Indeed, the wrongful death statute could be interpreted in this manner. According to the statute,
recovery includes danmag,s for "[t]he loss of consortium and the grief of the surviving spouse." 12 OKLA.
STAT. § 1053 (1991).
50. See Kraszewski, 291 P.2d at 244 n.2. Justice Opala filed a dissenting opinion and noted that the
majority created a new remedy for post mortem recovery. According to Opala, this was beyond the
judiciary's power and ill-advised. See id. at 250-51 (Opala, J., dissenting).
51. See id at246.
52. See id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had previously rejected "bystander" liability in the case
of Slaton v. Vansickle, 872 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1994). In Slaton, the court specifically rejected Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968) (allowing a mother to sue for emotional damages after witnessing
the death of her child in a car accident). According to the Slaton court, recovery for mental anguish is
limited to injuries or wrongs committed against the plaintiff and not for those wrongs committed against





involved directly in the accident.' In "bystander" cases, no preexisting duty exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereas in "direct victim" cases, the
defendant has assumed a duty to avoid causing the plaintiff severe emotional
distress 5
The distinction between "bystanders" on the one hand and "direct victims" on the
other is an integral part of the court's analysis. This distinction comes from the
court's vision of who is deserving of compensation from the alleged harmful actions
of a defendant. Accordingly, in Oklahoma, before a defendant can be held liable for
the mental or emotional damages of a third party, there must have been some original
wrong committed by the defendant against the plaintiff.' The "wrong" is evidently
too tenuous to establish in bystander cases, whereas, in direct victim cases, an
original wrong has already been committed" and the mental damages can be viewed
as attaching to that wrong. 8
2. Distinguishing Slaton v. Vansickle
Second, the court tried to illustrate why recovery should be allowed in this case
but denied in Slaton v. Vansickle 9 the court's most recent bystander-type decision.
Slaton did not involve the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and it
arose out of a manufacturer products liability suit.' It would appear inapplicable to
the discussion of the intentional tort in Kraszewski, but Slaton goes a long way in
explaining why the court decided Kraszewski the way it did.
In Slaton, the plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress from the manufac-
turer of a rifle when he learned that the primary victim had been killed by the
accidental discharge of a rifle manufactured by the defendant. The rifle allegedly
discharged when the plaintiff placed it in the back of his pickup truck. The bullet hit
and killed the primary victim. The plaintiff, however, did not learn of the accident
until hours after it occurred but still claimed mental suffering from learning of the
accident.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court characterized the Slaton action as one for negligent
infliction of emotional distress under the bystander theory of liability.6' The court
emphatically rejected this cause of action because the court does not recognize the
bystander theory unless there was an original wrong to the person suing!2 Further,
in Slaton, it was not the act of the defendant which caused the mental suffering but
54. See id.
55. See i.
56. See id. at 247.
57. The "wrong" in direct victim actions is reflected in the "direct physical involvement"
requirement. ld. ("[W]here a party is actually a direct victim of an accident and suffers mental injuries
from the observation of injuries to a third party [other courts have] allowed[ed] recovery for the plaintiffs
emotional injuries.").
58. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 247.
59. 872 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1994).
60. See id. at 930.
61. See id. at 931.
62. See id.; see also supra note 52 (discussing Oklahoma's rejection of Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912
(Cal. 1968)).
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rather the result of the accident (the death of the young woman) that caused the
alleged mental anguish.' Therefore, no connection existed between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiffs injury, and therefore no breach of duty existed as to the
plaintiff. The Slaton opinion seemed to intimate that direct participants could be
treated differently than bystanders.'
The Kraszewski court placed the Slaton cause of action into the noncompensable
category of bystander liability. ' The Slaton defendant had committed no original
wrong to the plaintiff. Rather, the Slaton plaintiff claimed emotional damages from
a manufacturer after being told his actions contributed to the death of a young
woman.67 In contrast, Kraszewski was directly involved in the accident. His
damages were part and parcel to the accident which caused his wife's injuries and
suffering: "The husband is a direct victim who was injured in the same accident
which gave rise to his emotional suffering."' Because the husband was subjected
to the same fear and danger which caused injury to the primary victim, recovery
would be allowed if the plaintiff met the three requirements stated above."
Finally, the Kraszewski court remanded the cause for submission to the jury.'
The court deemed the facts sufficient to cause a reasonable person to declare the
defendant's conduct extreme and outrageous. Therefore, the jury was to decide
whether the defendant's conduct was in fact extreme and outrageous and the extent
of Kraszewski's distress.7'
3. Other Tidbits Thrown in by the Court
Two other issues raised in the case are worth mentioning because they aid in
analyzing the Kraszewski opinion. First, the court relegated its only discussion of the
distinction between negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress to
footnote status. According to the court, no independent cause of action for negligent
63. See Slaton, 872 P.2d at 931.
64. See id.
65. See id. According to the court, the third party must show that his mental or emotional damages
"[arose] from an injury or wrong to the person rather than from another's suffering or wrongs committed
against another person." Id.
66. See Kraszewsli, 916 P.2d at 246.
67. See id. at 247.
68. Id.
69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
70. See Kraszewsli, 916 P.2d at 250. On the procedural issues such as burdens of proof, the court
followed the guidelines established by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965):
The court, in the first instance, must determine whether the defendant's conduct may
reasonably be regarded so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is
necessarily so. Where, under the facts before the court, reasonable persons may differ, it
is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether the conduct in any
given case has been significantly extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Likewise,
it is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether based upon the evidence
presented, severe emotional distress can be found. It is for the jury to determine, on the
evidence, sever. emotional distress in fact existed.
Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1377-78; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965).




infliction of emotional distress exists.? Rather, the action is based on the precepts
of a normal negligence cause of action; the third party distinction is obliterated by
the focus on the independent duty of the plaintiff to the defendant' Second, the
court briefly cited Restatement section 46 in support of the conclusion that the
intentional nature of Defendant's actions could be inferred from Defendant's
conduct.74 However, the court did not focus on the nature of the conduct directed
at Kraszewski but rather on the nature of the conduct directed at the primary victim,
Mrs. Kraszewski 5 Further, the issue of Defendant's intent or recklessness was not
an issue explicitly remanded for jury consideration.
IV. Analysis
The Kraszewski case provided the perfect vehicle for the Oklahoma Supreme Court
to speak clearly and to speak forcefully on the issue of emotional distress in the
third-party context; it did neither. Defendant's conduct cried out for redress, and the
state of the law was undeveloped in the area of "bystander" emotional or mental
injuries. Instead of articulating a clear vision, the court provided lawyers and
academics with a confused and jumbled opinion that mixes negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress concepts. Further, the decision wholly sidesteps the
effect of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in this area.
A. Confusion Between Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The holding of the court appears on its face to be a clear enunciation of the cause
of action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. However, the analysis
the court used to distill the three criteria for intentional infliction of emotional distress
is merged with an extensive discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Most of the cases the court cites are negligence cases,76 and most of the ideas the
court expounds are negligence conceptsn The court, however, never addresses why
the negligent infliction of emotional distress debate is relevant to the limitations it
places on the intentional cause of action. Further, while the court makes it clear that
bystander liability is not the law in Oklahoma, the court does not state why actual
physical involvement is required in cases in which the court already recognizes the
need for an independent action that protects an individual's mental and emotional well
being from intentional invasions.
Despite its other problems, the Kraszewski opinion makes one issue clear: When
approached with a third party action, the best way to proceed will probably be under
72. See id. at 244 n.l.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 250 n.28.
75. See id. According to the court, "we need not determine whether the analysis used by the
appellate court is correct because there is evidence in the transcript to support a finding that [defendant]
may have acted intentionally in either hitting Mrs. Kraszewski or in refusing to stop." Id.
76. See id. at 244 n.3.
77. See id. at 245-48.
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the negligent infliction of emotional distress theory. As stated above,"8 the negligent
infliction of emotional distress action is not an independent tort but rather is
subsumed under the precepts of a normal negligence cause of action. Therefore, the
plaintiff need only dlege the normal elements of a negligence action: (1) duty, (2)
breach, (3) causation, and (4) injury.9
In Oklahoma, the limitations imposed on the plaintiff in an intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress action are far more stringent than those imposed on
plaintiffs seeking to collect under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. This result is the opposite of orthodox tort law and grinds against common
sense. Generally, courts have imposed greater responsibility when the defendant's
conduct was intentional as opposed to merely negligent." When a defendant's
conduct is intentional, "[m]ore liberal rules are applied as to the consequences for
which the defendant will be held liable, the certainty of proof required, and the type
of damage for which recovery is to be permitted, as well as the measure of
compensation."'"
This conclusion i; further warranted by opinions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Early on, the court applied a less stringent standard when the defendant's conduct was
characterized as intentional, willful, or wanton.' For example, the plaintiff was not
required to prove physical manifestation of the mental distress when the defendant's
conduct constituted a "willful wrong" of which the "mental suffering is recognized
as an ordinary, natural and proximate result."'
However, in Oklahoma, the as yet ill-defined negligent infliction of emotional
distress action may relieve the plaintiff of proving what was so critical to the
Kraszewski opinion - actual physical involvement. Indeed, the Oklahoma Supreme
78. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
79. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 244 n.l ("[B]efore damages for mental suffering may be collected,
the plaintiff must establish: a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; a
failure of the defendant to perform the duty; and an injury to the plaintiff resulting from the failure.")
(emphasis added); see also Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Okla. 1997). The Oklahoma
version of negligent infliction of emotional distress, even though couched in the terms of a normal
negligence cause of action, is similar to the independent action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979) (en bane) (allowing
an action for mental anguish at witnessing injury to third party occasioned by defendant's negligence
when mental anguish has physical manifestations, there is a close personal relationship, and the third
party was within the zonv of danger of defendant's negligence) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 313 (1965)). However, a literal reading of the court's wording would not seem to require familial or
proximity requirements. Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 241 n.l.
80. See KEETON, supra note 4, § 8, at 37.
81. Id.
82. See generally Dean, 556 P.2d 257 (public autopsy); Mashunkashey, 113 P.2d 190 (fraudulent
inducement-into bigamoas marriage).
83. Dean, 556 P.2d at 261; Mashunkashey, 113 P.2d at 191; see also Rogers v. Willard, 223 S.W.
15, 17 (Ark. 1920) (allowing recovery when "fright" produces pain and suffering and the defendant's
actions can be regarded as a "willful wrong"); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 429, 429-31 (Utah 1916)
(holding, in a case where defendant cursed, abused, threatened, and drew a pistol on plaintiffs husband,
that plaintiff could reco% er if defendant's conduct could be characterized as willful and wanton, even in




Court cites an articlen which discusses the new Illinois rule for negligent infliction
of emotional distress in the case of direct victims. In Corgan v. Muehling," the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted the "simple negligence" rule.' Direct victims of a
defendant's negligence in Illinois can now sue for negligent infliction of emotional
distress without proving impact, zone of danger, or physical manifestation.' The
Illinois court stated that negligent infliction of emotional distress cases were to be
pleaded and proven under a negligence cause of action.' Further, the plaintiff is
likely relieved of the burden of showing that severe distress has resulted. 9
It is unlikely, however, that the Oklahoma Supreme Court meant to give up so
easily the physical manifestation doctrine in cases in which negligent infliction of
emotional distress is asserted. While not making the issue entirely clear in
Kraszewski, the court will probably require the physical manifestation component in
negligent infliction of mental suffering cases in order to give these damages the
requisite degree of genuineness. The court wants to be sure that the mental injury
is not feigned. By requiring "physical manifestation" of emotional injury, the mental
injury is validated and the risk of compensating a fictitious claim is decreased'
Therefore, in Oklahoma, when the negligent and intentional actions are placed next
to one another, their similarities are more obvious than their differences. For
example, like the newly created Kraszewski action, an action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress will probably require some actual physical injury or some
physical manifestation of mental injury. If Kraszewski were to assert negligent
infliction of emotional distress, which the Oklahoma Supreme Court said was
appropriate,' Kraszewski would be required to fill in the four elements of a
negligence cause of action. Presumably, Defendant had a duty to prevent causing
emotional distress to Kraszewski, Defendant breached that duty when he negligently
caused injuries to Kraszewski's wife, Defendant's negligence proximately caused
84. See Eric A. Cunningham, III, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Air Crash Cases:
A New Flight Path?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 935 (1992).
85. 574 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1991).
86. See id. at 606.
87. See Cunningham, supra note 84, at 952.
88. See Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606. Even if it is assumed that Mr. Kraszewski is a "direct victim"
of Defendant's negligence (which is arguable as he sought damages for his distress at viewing the harm
inflicted on his wife), the Oklahoma Supreme Court leaves unexplained why this negligence concept is
blindly transferred into the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress arena.
89. Under the Illinois rule, there is "[n]o impact requirement, no zone of danger requirement, no
physical manifestation requirement, and no apparent severe distress requirement." Cunningham, supra
note 84, at 952.
90. This appears to be the case. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 246 ("[A] plaintiff may recover on a
claim for physical injury if it is accompanied by mental stress or when metal [sic] distress is
accompanied by physical injury if the negligent act created a breach of duty to the party."); see also
discussion supra part II.A-C (discussing when physical manifestation of mental injury is required in
Oklahoma).
91. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 246. See generally KEEroN, supra note 4, § 54, at 361-62.
92. See id. at 244 n.1 ("[Kraszewski] argues that he may recover for his emotional suffering under
the theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress. We agree.").
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Kraszewski's mental suffering, and the mental injuries are manifested in some
physical way.'
Similarly, in the Kraszewski action for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress, the Oklahoma Supreme Court requires direct physical involvement in order
to guarantee the genuineness of the emotional injury. Because Kraszewski had some
direct physical involvement in the accident that gave rise to his injuries, the court is
reassured that Kraszewski's mental injuries are valid and that the defendant's conduct
was the cause of the mental injuries. The plaintiffs status as a "direct victim" is
common to both causes of action or at least similar "physical" or empirical
ingredients are involved in both actions.
After Kraszewski, however, not only is a plaintiff required to prove direct physical
involvement, but he also must show that he has sustained severe emotional distress
and that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Adding the "direct
physical involvement" factor to the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress
action appears to burden excessively the plaintiffs already stringent pleading and
proof requirements.
Moreover, this structure is confusing and analytically questionable. Even to the lay
person, intentional tortious conduct would appear more culpable than mere
negligence. Further, Kraszewski's claim is not one of normal negligence where the
defendant fails to can-y out some duty. Rather, Kraszewski claims damages as a
third-party viewing conduct that intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional
distress on Kraszewski himself.
In the negligence arena, other jurisdictions view the defendant's duty as one to
prevent unreasonable mental injuries to anyone who is a foreseeable victim," or to
anyone who is in the zone of danger,' or to anyone who receives physical
impact.' However, what Kraszewski leaves unexplained is why Oklahoma's version
93. The physical manifestation requirement would clearly not need by anything significant, as
Oklahoma has previously recognized both "shock," Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 195 F.2d 241,
243 (10th Cir. 1952) (Oklahoma law), and "hunger," Thompson v. Minnis, 202 P.2d 981, 986 (Okla.
1949), as sufficient manifeitations of emotional or mental suffering. Kraszewski himself alleged many
similar physical manifestations:
[I] have suffered extreme emotional distress, lost weight, have experienced decreased
energy levels, suffered sleeplessness, shed tears, altered my diet due to changes in my
digestive system, uxperienced nausea, seem more susceptible to illness, and have
experienced increases in stomach gases, which have distended my stomach.... I have
[also] suffered psychological manifestations which have affected me physically [and] post-
traumatic stress disorder.
Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 250 n.28.
94. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 248. For the pleading requirements of a general intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress cause of action, see Breeden v. League Services Corp., 575 P.2d
1374, 1377 (Okla. 1978).
95. See, e.g., Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437 (Nev. 1989) (adopting the rationale of
Dillon); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (allowing a cause of action where
doctor allegedly misdiagno3ed wife and caused foreseeable distress to husband); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d
912, 921 (Cal. 1968).
96. See, e.g., Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 844 (N.Y. 1984)




of the negligence concepts must be transplanted into the intentional action - why
a plaintiff must climb the walls of negligent infliction of emotional distress to get to
the normally more lenient standards of an intentional cause of action. When will a
plaintiff who is suing under the intentional cause of action and seeking damages from
viewing the injuries of another not be a "direct victim" of the defendant's conduct?
When the plaintiff has had no physical impact or no physical manifestations of
emotional injury? When the plaintiff is not in the zone of danger of the defendant's
conduct? And are these not negligence concepts? The intentional cause of action
already has a built-in means of determining the "direct-victim" status of the plaintiff
(if that is what the Oklahoma Supreme Court wishes to label the plaintiff in such
cases) - the proof of the defendant's intent or recklessness with respect to the
plaintiff.8
Unfortunately these confusing issues have been logged in the case books; the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has planted the weeds of the negligent infliction of
emotional distress action into the newly plowed field of intentional infliction of
emotional distress claimed by third parties. Courts often justify the physical
manifestation of mental suffering requirement in negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases by the fear of fraudulent claims. 9 However, those concerns should
be absent in intentional infliction of severe emotional distress cases. Because the
basis of liability rests in the intentional or reckless nature of the defendant's conduct,
the "direct physical involvement" requirement appears unnecessary and onerous to
a plaintiff who must already allege and prove both severe emotional distress and
intentional or reckless conduct that was extreme and outrageous."m
Even though the Kraszewski opinion leaves many questions unanswered, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's adoption of the direct physical involvement requirement
can be explained in two ways. First, the requirement can be seen as an extension of
the historical development of emotional damages in Oklahoma. Second, the
requirement can be viewed as either an extension or an unhealthy mutation of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46(2).
B. Historical Answers?
The strict limitations the Oklahoma Supreme Court imposes on the intentional
cause of action can be viewed through the lens of history as merely an extension of
Emotional Distress in North Carolina, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 319, 322 (1995) (discussing different
approaches to bystander liability and noting, in the "physical impact" discussion, Stoddard v. Davidson,
513 A.2d 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), in which the court found sufficient impact where the plaintiff was
'jostled" when his car ran over a dead body of a person). Oklahoma, it appears, adopts a version of the
physical impact rule by requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove physical manifestations of mental injury.
The "physical manifestation" requirement is generally considered less stringent than the "physical impact"
requirement. See KEETON, supra note 4, § 54, at 364.
98. See also discussion infra part VI.B.
99. See KEETON, supra note 4, § 54, at 366 ("It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all
human activity if the defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the
lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it ... .
100. See also discussion infra part VII.B.
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the fears of the past. That is, the court has a skeptical view of emotional damages
and desires an independent means of verification such as physical suffering. Here,
that concern is transformed into the first requirement of "direct physical invol-
vement." The intentional or negligent nature of the defendant's conduct is irrelevant;
the only concern is that there be an objectively verifiable measure of the defendant's
conduct. Therefore, because the plaintiff also suffered injuries in the accident, any
worries about the genuineness of the emotional damages are allayed due to the
overriding nature of the physical damages and the parasitic nature of the emotional
damages.
Assuming this is an underlying fear of the court, such concerns are misplaced. It
is difficult to explain how the court can link physical involvement in the accident and
damages claimed from watching the pain and suffering of a family member. Why
is individual physical involvement, unconnected with the primary victim's injuries and
suffering, necessary to give rise to a cause of action for emotional damages from
watching the primary victim's injuries?1 '
The court's analysis in this area once again fails to distinguish between the intent
to inflict severe emotional distress on the third party and negligent infliction of
emotional distress on a third party. In the former, there is no need to worry about
direct physical involvement because the defendant either intended to inflict the
emotional distress or was in reckless disregard of a high degree of probability that
the emotional distress would follow." The nature of the defendant's conduct alone
warrants a cause of action in which actual physical involvement is not required.
Indeed, under Restatement section 46(2), the plaintiff must be a family member and
be present at the scene of the accident. It seems reasonable to conclude that the
intentional or reckless nature of the action, and the other limitations listed within
section 46(2), would severely restrict the number of cases in which such damages
could be claimed.
C. Gleaning from the Restatement
On the other hand, and probably more likely, the court may be viewing section
46(2) with a skeptical eye by adding a requirement to its strictures. In addition to the
subsection's familial and proximity requirements, the Kraszewski opinion could be
viewed as adding the requirement of actual physical involvement in the incident
giving rise to the praintiffs emotional damages. In this way, the court is further
restricting the cases in which a plaintiff may recover for such emotional damages.
101. The court answers this question in terms of duty: "[Defendant] argues that the breach of that
duty [to Kraszewski] will not support a cause of action for the husband's emotional injuries from seeing
his wife's suffering. We dto not agree. The driver breached his duty to the husband when he negligently
struck and injured him with his truck." See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 247. However, the Kraszewski
court's fear of expanding the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress to include conduct directed
at third-parties seems to have resulted in an expansive "duty" concept. After all, the compensated mental
injury (watching the injuries to a close family member) seems to result from the breach of the defendant's
duty to not strike and injare the plaintiff with the vehicle. Id.




Reading Kraszewski in this light is also arguable. First, the court is silent about
section 46(2) of the Restatement, neither discussing nor citing the subsection. Second,
recognition of the subsection would controvert the major premise of the Kraszewski
opinion - that some independent harm was committed against the plaintiff that does
not depend on the existence of the three-party relationship.
Even though the Oklahoma Supreme Court never discusses the issue, the
distinction between section 46(1) and section 46(2) of the Restatement is a clear and
concrete separation between direct infliction of emotional distress and third-party
infliction of emotional distress, respectively. The Oklahoma Supreme Court either
fails to recognize the distinction or tacitly declines to accept it. While it is true that
cases discussing "bystander" or "witnessing" cases often make minute distinctions and
cases can often be found to support any position,"° the Kraszewski case is even
more adrift. While stating that Oklahoma explicitly adopts section 46 as governing
the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, the court declines to
follow it. The requirements the court develops seem to follow the guidelines of
section 46(2), but the language of the opinion appears devoted to section 46(1).
Therefore, to analyze the case and predict what the future holds in this area of tort
law, it seems appropriate to describe both section 46(1) and section 46(2).
V. Where to Go After Kraszewski
A. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
As stated above, Oklahoma has recognized the need to protect an individual's
mental and emotional security from intentional invasions."4 The court accordingly
adopted the "narrow standards"' 5 of section 46(1) of the Restatement." The
court, however, has been silent about section 46(2), neither discussing nor citing the
subsection in Kraszewski. Ironically, section 46(2) appears to provide the best means
to resolve the conflict created by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Kraszewski.
Section 46(1) also provides some answers to the questions presented in Kraszewski.
1. Extension of Section 46(1)?
The cause of action under section 46(1) is generally considered to contain four
elements: (1) the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct must
be extreme and outrageous; and (3) the conduct must be the cause (4) of severe
103. See 4 STUART M. SPEISER Er AL, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 16:23 (1987) (citing
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 929 (Cal. 1968); Archibald v. Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (Cal.
1969); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129, 132 (Conn. 1973)).
104. See Breeden v. League Servs. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Okla. 1978).
105. See Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 985 n.27 (Okla. 1992) (holding, in action by excom-
municated church members against church leaders, that defendant's conduct was not sufficiently extreme
and outrageous as a matter of law and noting that the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress
tort is "governed by the narrow standards" of the Restatement); Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 76-77
(Okla. 1986) (holding, in a suit by an employee against employer, that the employer's conduct was not
sufficiently extreme and outrageous as a matter of law).
106. See Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1376.
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emotional distress." Most of the Oklahoma cases dealing with section 46(1) have
discussed the requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct. The court rather
methodically states that section 46(1) requires conduct that is extreme and outrageous
and that the defendant's conduct could or could not be interpreted by a reasonable
person as outrageous. The case is then disposed of on these considerations."'
The Kraszewski court's emphasis on harm to the plaintiff could, however, support
a conclusion that this is a section 46(1) claim. The third party issue would be
immaterial because of the independent harm inflicted on the plaintiff. Therefore, if
the court is adamant about requiring harm to the person suing, the court should
follow the requirements of section 46(1) and wholly ignore the issue of whether the
plaintiff is a bystander or direct victim. By following this normal cause of action that
the court has repeatedly developed in its case law, confusion will abate because of
the absence of the third-party variable. All the court would need to consider,
pursuant to the language adopted in Breeden," is whether the conduct directed at
the plaintiff could reasonably be interpreted as extreme and outrageous and whether
the harm suffered by the plaintiff could reasonably be interpreted as severe. Other
considerations worthy of the court's attention are whether the conduct could
reasonably be interpreted as intentional or reckless and whether the conduct
reasonably supports the causation requirement. These four factors would then help
decide the summary judgment motion.
The problem with this view is that Kraszewski's damages allegedly stem from
viewing the harm inflicted on his wife. It is difficult to reconcile a section 46(1)
action with this third party involvement. In fact, section 46(1) presupposes recovery
for the harm inflicted on the plaintiff, not recovery for viewing harm inflicted on
another. This latter scenario is delegated to the guidelines of section 46(2).
However, if the court remains committed to the rule of direct physical invol-
vement, its rationale will probably follow the historical cases cited above.'"" That
is, Kraszewski's mental damages from viewing the injuries to his wife could be
107. See Shoen v. Amerco, Inc., 896 P.2d 469, 476 (Nev. 1995); Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 665
P.2d 1141, 1145 (Nev. 1983); Wigfall v. Society Nat'l Bank, 669 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995);
Lewmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1353 (10th Cir. 1997) (Oklahoma law); Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d
776, 778-79 (S.C. 1981) (citing Vicnire v. Ford Motor Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154 (Me. 1979)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social
Decency and the Limits of'Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress By Outrageous
Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42, 46 (1982); 4 SPEIsER, supra note 103, § 16:13.
108. See Smith v. Farmers Coop. Ass'n of Butler, 825 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Okla. 1992); Eddy v.
Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1986); Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1378; McMullen v. City of Del City, 920
P.2d 528, 531 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996); Zahorsky v. Community Nat'i Bank of Alva, 883 P.2d 198, 200
(Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Haynes v. South Community Hosp. Management, Inc., 793 P.2d 303, 307 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1990); cf Miller v. Miller, No. 87615, 1998 WL 128795, at *8 (Okla. 1998) (recognizing that
plaintiff must prove intentional or reckless conduct and show severe emotional distress); Marshall v. OK
Rental & Leasing, Inc., 939 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Okla. 1997) (dismissing intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim because plaintiff failed to show defendant intentionally caused employee to sexually harass
plaintiff or extreme and outrageous conduct which recklessly caused severe emotional distress).
109. Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1377-78.




viewed as part and parcel to the physical damages he suffered in the accident. Using
this formula, the court could remain true to its requirement of physical involvement
while still allowing a bystander-type plaintiff to recover for intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress."'
However, this is a wholly illusory structure and strikingly similar to the confusing
doctrine enunciated in Kraszewski. Adoption of section 46(2) would be a more
precise analytical approach.
2. Adoption of Section 46(2)
This section of the Restatement requires three actors: a defendant, a primary
victim, and a plaintiff-third party."' According to courts in other jurisdictions, the
elements of a cause of action for damages under section 46(2)(a), which is also
appropriate in the Kraszewski case as a familial relationship was involved, are as
follows: (1) the conduct complained of was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct
was directed at a primary victim; (3) the plaintiff is a member of the immediate
family of that primary victim; (4) the plaintiff was personally present when the
extreme and outrageous conduct took place; (5) the plaintiff sustained severe
emotional distress as a direct result of the conduct; and (6) the person whose conduct
is complained of intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to the
plaintiff."'
This analytical framework was developed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Wiehe
v. Kukal."4 The case involved a boundary dispute between the plaintiffs husband
and the defendant. The defendant allegedly waved a pitchfork at the plaintiffs
11. What still remains questionable is why the independent protection of mental security is not
recognized in third-party cases. No rationale is given to explain why direct physical involvement
guarantees the authenticity of the mental damages arising from viewing injuries to another party.
112. For the distinction between a "primary victim" and a "third party," see supra note 5.
113. See Wiehe v. Kukal, 592 P.2d 860, 863 (Kan. 1979); see also Anspach v. Tomkins Indus., Inc.,
817 F. Supp. 1499, 1508-09 (D. Kan. 1993) (recognizing the rule stated in Wiehe, but holding conduct
of defendant-company was not sufficiently outrageous to allow husband to collect for the sexual
harassment allegedly inflicted on wife, nor did defendant's conduct cause husband sufficiently extreme
emotional distress); Foster v. Trentham's Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (citing section
46(2) of the Restatement and holding cause of action stated for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress when complaint alleged defendant maliciously instituted criminal proceedings against plaintiffs
husband); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 422 (W. Va. 1991) (adopting formula similar to that
of Wiehe but changing the sixth element to "if the emotional distress results in bodily injury, any person
who was present at the time of the outrageous conduct may recover"); cf Latremore v. Latremore, 584
A.2d 626, 631-32 (Me. 1990) ("[Slection [46(2)] is designed to apply to a situation where the intent to
cause harm is directed toward a third party [the primary victim] and the plaintiff [third party or
bystander] is injured indirectly by watching the third party [the primary victim] suffer."). For an
interesting line of cases involving the Arkansas state and federal courts, see the following: Orlando v.
Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting it was "probable" that Arkansas would adopt
section 46(2) of the Restatement); Deason v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 771 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Ark.
1989) (failing to recognize section 46(2) when given the opportunity); Poindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F.
Supp. 1052, 1455 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (citing Deason and noting that Arkansas refused to recognize section
46(2) and therefore the Arkansas tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress only includes
conduct directed at the person bringing the action).
114. 592 P.2d at 863.
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husband and hurled a "spontaneous verbal outburst [that was] profane and
disparaging.""' 5 The plaintiff asserted a claim for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress arising out of the defendant's conduct directed at her husband.
According to the plaintiff, ever since the incident, "her health has been poor; she
cries a lot, has no appetite, has lost weight, and is depressed."
' 6
The Kansas Supreme Court eventually held that the defendant could not be held
liable for the plaintiff's distress because the defendant's conduct was not extreme and
outrageous as a matter of law."7 However, the court did leave room for an action
of this type. The most significant part of the Kansas opinion is the court's recognition
of the intent requirement - it requires that the defendant recklessly or intentionally
cause severe emotional distress to the third party, while also recognizing that the
defendant's conduct is directed at the primary victim."' This element of the cause
of action is omitted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in its analysis of the
Kraszewski case.
By ignoring section 46(2), the Oklahoma Supreme Court creates confusion about
the intentional tort when invoked by plaintiffs who seek recovery for emotional
damages from viewling an incident. The Kraszewski court refused to focus on the
distinction between regligence and intentional/reckless concepts, whereas, the six-step
analysis provided by the Kansas court carefully parses out this subsection, focusing
on the intentional or reckless nature of the action. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
may characterize this action as a bystander-type action and therefore nonactionable.
But it does so at the price of creating confusion for attorneys and academics.
The reason for denying recovery in cases like Kraszewski is the supposed absence
of any wrong against the plaintiff. This concern is, however, abrogated by the careful
six-step analysis enunciated above. When the defendant's conduct is intentional or
reckless, there is sufficient wrong to justify an independent action where actual
physical involvement in the incident is not required. The Oklahoma court has already
recognized that emotional security warrants independent protection. The six-step
process ensures that the plaintiff has severe emotional distress and that liability is
based on the intentianal or reckless nature of the defendant's conduct. Validity of
injury is ensured by the distilling process of this clear doctrine, which provides
assurance that the plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury to warrant recovery.
B. Basis of Liability
As this note has tried to make clear, the most significant part of the tort of
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress needed for analyzing the Kraszewski
fact pattern is the tort's basis of liability. According to the Restatement, the defendant
must act either intentionally or recklessly with respect to the plaintiff."' That is, the
defendant must eith-.r desire to cause the mental distress or know that the mental
115. Id. at 863-64.
116. Id. at 862.
117. See id. at 865.
118. See id. at 864-55.




distress is substantially certain to follow from the defendant's conduct." The
defendant can also be held liable for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress
when his conduct is reckless, recklessness being "deliberate disregard of a high
degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.''
1. Intent
When a court decides whether a defendant intended to inflict severe emotional
distress, the court must make the decision with reference to the consequences of the
act rather than the act itself.'" The actor is held liable for consequences that he
intended to inflict or for consequences he knew were substantially certain to result
from his act." According to Prosser, there are three basic elements to the common
usage of "intent": intent (1) is a state of mind, (2) is about the consequences of an
act (or omission) and not about the act itself, and (3) extends to both having a
purpose to bring about a given consequence and having a belief that certain
consequences were substantially certain to follow."
One of the earliest cases dealing with the intent requirement in the context of third-
party liability was Taylor v. Vallelunga. In Taylor, the plaintiff-daughter
witnessed a beating inflicted on her father by the defendants. She asserted an
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress cause of action. The California
District Court of Appeals, however, denied her claim because she failed to show that
the defendants intended to cause her to suffer severe emotional distress or knew that
severe emotional distress was substantially certain to follow."
Even though Taylor was decided before the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
case does emphasize the required mental state for the intentional aspect of the tort:
The defendant must intentionally seek to inflict severe emotional distress on the third
party, and not necessarily only the primary victim."n That is, the defendant must
have acted with the intent to cause the severe emotional distress to the third party,
or the defendant must have acted with the knowledge that the severe emotional
distress to the third party was substantially certain to result."n Moreover, Taylor
was decided before the Restatement allowed reckless conduct to fall within the
confines of this tort."9 As a result, more conduct will fall under the intentional
cause of action by the inclusion of reckless conduct.
120. See id. § 8A.
121. Id. § 46 cnt. i.
122. See id. § 8A cmt. a.
123. See id. § 8A cmt. b.
124. See KE-TON, supra note 4, § 8, at 34 (footnotes omitted).
125. 339 P.2d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
126. See id. at 911. The court also denied her claim because the defendants did not know that the
plaintiff-daughter was present and watching the beating. Id.
127. See id.; see also Vescovo v. New Way Enters., Ltd., 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89-90 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (allowing a cause of action to proceed against defendant-newspaper because complaint alleged
defendant intended to inflict harm on plaintiff, the son of a co-plaintiff about whom the defendant had
published a sexual solicitation advertisement).
128. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
129. See Taylor, 339 P.2d at 911 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 46 (1946 Supp.)).
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2. Reckless Conduct
The standard for recklessness is defined in the Restatement.'" Recklessness is
often described as a state of mind in between the intent to do harm and the mere
unreasonable risk of harm.' Reckless conduct is still a sort of negligence and
therefore does not necessarily involve an intention to do harm, but it is also conduct
so far from the reasonable state of mind that it is treated as intentional conduct.'
According to one court, the defendant must have prior knowledge of specific facts,
he must know or have reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of
harm to another, and he must proceed to act with disregard as to the harm that may
result.'
The Restatement itself distinguishes intent from recklessness. Recklessness, unlike
intent, has both a subjective and an objective component: The act must have been
intended by the actor, but the actor need not intend the harm which results from the
act.'" It is sufficient if the actor realizes or should have realized from the facts as
he knew them that there was a strong probability that harm would result.'35 The
Restatement makes clear that recklessness differs from negligence in that reckless
conduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of
certain facts that create a strong likelihood of danger or with knowledge of facts
which would disclcse such a danger to a reasonable person.'
Applying the recdess standard in the Wiehe case, the Kansas Supreme Court held
that the defendant's conduct could not be considered reckless as directed to the
plaintiff.'37 According to the court, even an assault on the plaintiffs husband was
not the type of conduct that would ordinarily result in severe emotional distress to
bystanders, even though the plaintiff was a member of the primary victim's
family.1
3'
130. The Restatemnt (Second) of Torts defines recklessness as follows:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act
or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only
that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that
such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
131. See KEErON, supra note 4, § 34, at 212. The words "willful" or "wanton" are usually
interchangeable with "recklessness." Id.
132. See id. at 212-13.
133. See Wiehe, 592 P.2d at 864-65; see also Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Mass.
1988) (stating in dicta, in action by mother and brother of sexually abused child to collect for intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress, that defendant did not intend to cause severe emotional distress,
but it was for the trier of fact to determine whether defendant acted recklessly or "indifferent to the likely
effect of his conduct on family members who would be apt in time to learn of his outrageous conduct")
(emphasis added).
134. See REsTATiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. f (1965).
135. See id.
136. See id. § 500 cmt. g.





The basis of liability issue is important in analyzing the Kraszewski case
because it goes to the heart of the court's confusion. For some unexplained
reason, the court believes the intent or reckless requirement applies to the
defendant's conduct relative to the primary victim. According to the court, there
is no need to discuss the intent requirement because "there is evidence .. to
support a finding that [Defendant] may have acted intentionally in either hitting
Mrs. Kraszewski or in refusing to stop .... ""
However, the proper application of the intent requirement in the Kraszewski case,
as illustrated in Taylor and Wiehe, is whether the defendant acted with the intent to
inflict severe emotional distress on the plaintiff-third party or knew with substantial
certainty that such severe emotional distress was likely to result. Alternatively, the
defendant can be held liable under the intentional tort if he acted in reckless disregard
of whether such severe emotional distress would actually result.
While it is debatable whether Defendant intended to inflict severe emotional
distress on Kraszewski,'" it appears almost certain that Defendant's conduct could
be classified as reckless with respect to his duty to prevent severe emotional distress
to Kraszewski. The court's explanation of intent appears to resemble the Res-
tatement's definition of recklessness, at least insofar as the Oklahoma Supreme Court
only requires that the plaintiff intend the act that leads to the emotional distress -
hitting Mrs. Kraszewski. T" Defendant's intent to bring about the consequences of
his actions, on the other hand, is not discussed. 42
Assuming Defendant intended to hit Mrs. Kraszewski, it appears clear, almost as
a matter of law, that Defendant acted recklessly with respect to Mr. Kraszewski:
Defendant drove through the parking lot knowing that, were he to proceed, the result
would be serious emotional harm to Mr. Kraszewski. At the very least, Defendant
had knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonable person to stop in order to
prevent serious harm. Because Defendant proceeded though the intersection, his
conduct could properly be characterized as reckless with respect to Kraszewski's
emotional distress and therefore render Defendant liable.
139. Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 249 n.28.
140. See infra note 142.
141. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 249 n.28; see also Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 399 (Okla.
1958) (holding, in an action for assault and battery, that intent was proven when the plaintiff showed a
"wrongful act" on the part of the defendant, which, in this case, was the "willful and deliberate throwing
of wooden blackboard erasers."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. f (1965) ("While an act
to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results
from it.").
142. See Kraszewski, 916 P.2d at 249 n.28. Moreover, because Defendant was legally intoxicated,
a serious question exists as to whether Defendant had the requisite mental faculties to meet the subjective
standards of the intent requirement. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. In criminal law, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that intoxication cannot exculpate a defendant, but
intoxication can be considered by the jury to determine whether a defendant possessed the necessary
intent to commit the crime. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. State, 801 P.2d 729, 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990)
(burglary); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (homicide); Williams v. State,
513 P.2d 335, 339 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (homicide); Gower v. State, 298 P.2d 461, 463-64 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1956) (larceny).
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While the Kraszewski decision was correct to focus on the plight of the third party,
it nevertheless misconceived the nature of the plaintiffs claim. Mr. Kraszewski's
claim did not arise because he was physically involved in the accident which gave
rise to his injuries. Rather, Mr. Kraszewski's claim arose out of the alleged
intentional or reckless conduct of Defendant directed at Kraszewski himself.
VI. Conclusion
Emotional or mental damages have had a long and tortured history in Oklahoma.
From the early requirement of physical suffering to the modem requirement of direct
physical involvement, emotional damages have always been viewed with skepticism
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
However, with Odahoma's adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
46, many considered the guidelines of that section to be controlling and believed the
law in this area to be relatively settled. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.
Rather, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has embarked on a confusing and inconsistent
path regarding recovery for emotional damages in third-party situations. While
explicitly adopting section 46(1) in run-of-the-mill intentional infliction of emotional
distress cases, it has started down a different path regarding section 46(2).
Kraszewski started this descent, and hopefully future cases will change its direction.
The court's decision in Kraszewski can be explained in two ways: (1) the court is
merely following th- traditions of the past with respect to emotional damages or (2)
the court is reading the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46(2), tacitly rejecting
it, and supplanting it with a new view taken from negligence concepts. This latter
position is more likely and the more confusing.
Instead of rejecting section 46(2), the court should reconsider its decision in light
of the criteria developed in cases in other jurisdictions. The court's concerns over a
wrong committed against the plaintiff would be appeased by the intentional nature
of the action itself. Actual physical involvement is not the guarantee of a genuine
claim in cases like Kraszewski; rather the intentional or reckless nature of the
defendant's conduct is the "wrong" committed, and this aspect of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress guarantees the validity of the emotional
distress claim. This conclusion is further warranted by the court's recognition of the
independent right to be free from intentional invasions of mental and emotional
security. This right should not be diminished merely because a third party is
involved.
Matthew B. Free
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